North Korea's curious brand of nuclear
brinkmanship and blackmail will become a recurring nightmare for the
United States and its allies in the region unless a longer-term policy
of preemptive containment is implemented to prevent Pyongyang from
obtaining the materials to develop nuclear weapons.
The current spate of diplomacy may be useful -- perhaps even
successful -- in managing the short-term fallout from Kim Jong Il's
decision to restart his nuclear reactors and pull out of the Nuclear
Non-Proliferation Treaty. But such well-intentioned efforts can't
quash the North Korean leader's long-term nuclear ambitions. They also
put Washington in the awkward position of being compelled by its
friends to engage with a regime whose repudiation of every
international norm for state behavior offers no basis for engagement.
As the U.S. proceeds, it must avoid anything that appears like
negotiating with a terrorist regime.
At the other end of the policy spectrum, preemptive military solutions
like attacking North Korea's nuclear or missile installations could
well cause Pyongyang to retaliate against Japan and South Korea with a
blitzkrieg of troops and missiles. And threatening Kim's nonexistent
economy with further sanctions is little more than bluster.
A new approach is needed to adequately address the North Korean
threat. Japan, Australia and South Korea are currently engaged in
diplomacy with Pyongyang. They should, in their talks, insist on the
near-term removal of nuclear stockpiles as a prerequisite for food and
fuel that would be provided for nonnuclear electricity production.
Russian natural gas from deposits near the Korean peninsula could
replace any need for nuclear power, while also giving Moscow an
incentive to stand firm against North Korean nuclear actvities.
At the same time, a U.S.-led alliance needs to find ways of preventing
materials necessary to weapons production from getting to North Korea.
This would require firm commitments from China -- and, perhaps more
important, Pakistan -- to stop providing Pyongyang with nuclear
components, particularly the gas centrifuges that form the heart of
uranium enrichment plants and the ring magnets that are vital to
centrifuge function. Bomb designs, particularly the specialized bomb
casings needed to house highly radioactive uranium cores and spherical
implosion trigger devices needed for detonation, must also be stopped
at the source.
Last month's sale by China of 20 tons of tributyl phosphate to North
Korean agents, as reported in the press, demonstrates the magnitude of
the problem. This is a key chemical needed to extract plutonium from
depleted uranium fuel rods in a process known as "purex."
The Chinese shipment was enough to extract plutonium for four to five
bombs from the approximately 8,000 spent fuel rods North Korea has.
Efforts must be directed toward preventing any more of the chemicals
needed to separate plutonium from depleted uranium fuel rods from
reaching North Korean plants. Plutonium reprocessing would allow the
North Koreans to miniaturize nuclear cores for missile warheads -- or
worse, to shape them into small tactical weapons for sale to
terrorists on the black market. If Beijing continues to enable
Pyongyang's plutonium separation, it must also accept that such
cooperation could spark a decision by Japan or South Korea to develop
nuclear weapons.
More troubling still is the specter of Pakistani cooperation with
North Korea. Islamabad vehemently denies having provided North Korea
with any nuclear assistance in the past, but mounting intelligence
data and forensic evidence suggest otherwise. The same South Korean
intelligence report that exposed the existence of the uranium
enrichment facility that sparked the U.S. confrontation with North
Korea last fall also reportedly noted remarkable similarities between
centrifuge components bought by North Korea for its plant and those
known to be used by Pakistan at its enrichment facilities.
Press reports have repeatedly documented how a North Korean missile
proliferation company, Changgwang Sinyong Corp. (CSC), provided
missile parts to Pakistan for its Shaheen and Ghauri missiles,
although the company has been sanctioned by the U.S. State Department
only for its sale of missile components to Yemen and Iran.
CSC's chief procurement officer in Islamabad during the late 1990s,
Kang Thae Yun, doubled as economic counselor at Pyongyang's Islamabad
embassy. His wife, Kim Sa Nae, was mysteriously gunned down in
Islamabad on June 7, 1998, a week after Pakistan successfully
detonated five nuclear devices based largely on Chinese designs.
According to a senior Pakistani police source who filed the murder
report (which was later leaked to Western journalists and published in
November 1998), Kim was shot by North Korean agents working at
Pakistan's top-secret nuclear facility, the A.Q. Khan Research
Laboratories in Kahuta, who feared she was going to defect and provide
Western intelligence agencies with hard evidence of Pakistan's
assistance to North Korea in developing its fledgling nuclear program.
Islamabad officially maintains that the murder stemmed from a
kidnapping attempt gone awry.
But such nuclear shenanigans -- which admittedly happened under a
different regime at a time when U.S.-Pakistan relations were severely
strained -- must be curtailed. The Bush administration must hold its
ally to answer, even if privately, about the exact extent and nature
of assistance Islamabad provided Pyongyang in its uranium enrichment
and bomb-making facilities.
Washington should insist, at a minimum, that further U.S. financial
aid be tied to verifiable and tangible guarantees that Pakistani
nuclear materials, bomb-making and enrichment technology components,
and scientists, both active and retired, are not made available to
other countries -- officially or unofficially.
Pyongyang's nuclear bluff cannot be called until Washington persuades
Beijing and Islamabad that nuclear cooperation with North Korea is
reckless and cannot be tolerated. Interrupting the supply of nuclear
technology, bomb-making materials and extraction chemicals is the best
way to curtail North Korea's habitual policy of nuclear blackmail.


